Introduction
In several recent decades the evolution of cognition enjoyed increasingly intensive interest within multiple disciplines - psychology and sociology, biology and ethology, philosophy and epistemology. This resulted in multiple hypothesis and approaches to reconstructing the evolution of cognition (Van Horik&Emery, 2011) from various perspectives, e.g. phylogenetic (historical) analysis, ecological correlates of cognition, brains size, comparative analysis, natural selection theory, genetic and brain structures development, learning and social problem solving capacities, etc.

Some approaches (e.g. evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology) tend to focus on the question how human cognition became so uniquely complicated and gained its extraordinary abilities. These approaches seek answers in transformation of cognition from our Stone Age ancestors and primates and related brain changes. Human cognition undoubtedly made us unique and specialized in thinking (Heyes, 2003), associating, operating with abstract and imaginary objects, using symbols and language, and ultimately allowed us to develop elaborate social institutions such as culture, art, religion, science and many others that non-humans do not have. Though these approaches have brought up many astonishing discoveries, they do not reveal how the cognition evolved on its way to primates or Stone Age humans and what were the milestones and key factors that shaped it in phylogenesis.
One of the most influential biologists Richard C. Lewontin provided a comprehensive review of possibility to study evolution of cognition from a natural selection perspective. His conclusion about this approach was rather skeptical: “Form and even behavior may leave fossil remains, but forces like natural selection do not. It might be interesting to know how cognition (whatever that is) arose and spread and changed, but we cannot know. Tough luck.” (Lewontin, 1998).

Structurally this work organized in several paragraphs considering key questions to studying evolution of cognition, main function of cognition, and proposed approach to evolution of cognition from phylogenetic (historical) perspective of five major transition and successive development of basic cognitive patters controlling recognition and addressing tasks of survival and reproduction.

Questions to studying evolution of cognition
Even today we are still far from coming up with a uniform approach and conventional fundamental theory describing how cognition evolved, and a number of fundamental questions are still to be answered, some of them are reviewed below. The following questions largely correlate with classic Tinbergen’s four questions to studying behavior and, given that cognition and behavior are intrinsically interconnected, they also can be applied to studying cognition and its evolution.

1) What exactly is the progress when speaking about evolution of cognition? What is the scale and key criteria to measure complexity and “smartness” of species?

“A major problem of evolutionary theories is to decide on the scale that the evolved states of a system are to be ordered along” (Levins & Lewontin, 1985) and evolution of cognition is not an exception. Progress and evolutionary changes in cognition have to be measured in the way allowing us to answer questions like: how do we decide that some species are more cognitively evolved? At what extent (if at all) it is correct to say that some species are more superior or “smarter” than others? "In what sense is a mammal more complex than a bacterium?"( Levins & Lewontin, 1985) and what is a definition of complexity “that will distinguish between people and frogs”? (Lewontin, 1998). There seems to be no compilation of the phylogenetic scales to which one could refer to answer questions like: "Is a porpoise a higher animal than a cat?" (MacLean EL, Matthews LJ, Hare BA, et al, 2012). Is there any convincing explanation to the fact that "cognitively primitive” or “lower” species survive and bloom along with “advanced” and “higher” ones? As William Hodos and CBG Campbell pointed out – coming with systematic model of behavior and cognition requires “ridding ourselves of concepts like the phylogenetic scale, higher and lower animals (Hodos&Campbell, 1969)

2) How can we study cognition if it is not directly observable?

Multiple researches demonstrated absence of direct correlation between cognitive capacities and any observable parameters like brain size, morphology, lifestyle, habitat, place on the Scala naturae or phylogenetic tree, etc. All living species are perfectly adapted to their environment and are capable to cope with their routine challenges and demands. They address adaptational tasks smartly enough to survive and reproduce, otherwise they would inevitable extinct very soon. “Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind”. (Quine 1969, cited by Vollmer, 2012).
On the other hand, we can see that during laboratory tests some species demonstrate “higher” intellectual, learning and problem solving capacities. Some species seem to be more “creative” and “smarter” than others when passing tests developed by scientists and measured on an “anthropocentric” scale with human on top. Does the ability of one species to resolve more complicated tasks in a laboratory than others make them smarter? Frank Beach in his classic work “The Snark was a Boojum” (Beach, 1950) raised the question – why the number of species used in laboratory tests are so limited and how their results can be extrapolated to other species. This question has still to be answered.

3) How can we differentiate evolution from modifications and transformation, adjustments, variables? What are the key parameters that can be used when studying evolution of cognition.

Discussing a problem of a progress, R. Levins and R. Lewontin emphasized that “all evolutionary theories, weather of physical, biological, or social phenomena, are theories of change” (Levins & Lewontin, 1985). Evolution means progressive changes and transitions from one state, quality, number of sets of properties, etc. to another. However, “evolution cannot be the change from less to more complex in general“ (Levins & Lewontin, 1985) and not every change means evolution. It is still not clear how to distinguish evolution from modifications and transformations at any given case. Darwin himself did not use the word “evolution” in the first edition of his book On the Origin of Species, referring instead to “descent with modification” (Millstein, 2019). This question is not answered even in regard of biological evolution, despite some solutions were offered; for example DNA codes (Smith&Szathmary, 1995) or brain size and its development, however it remains a field of high controversy (Healy SD, Rowe C. 2007). Nevertheless, “evolution” became a cliché that is easily (and sometimes, uncritically) applied to any biological and cognitive development of species over the course of their existence. But before we get to studying major stages, milestones and transition in evolution of cognition, we have to identify and clearly specify its key parameters and criteria.

4) What are the driving forces of evolution of cognition? What is the reason for cognition to evolve?

Unless we take a creationist point of view, evolution cannot be regarded as just an intrinsic mechanism that drives living organism from primitive to complex, from “worse” to “better” ones. We should look for a reason and drivers of evolution triggering its development. As evolution of cognition is a part of biological evolution, major transitions should be made under the pressure of external tasks and challenges that species had to address to stay alive. Darwin himself claimed this point clearly – there is no evolution, if there are no constrains (Darwin, 1959). Evolution is not encoded in organic nature in contrast, for examples, to a child development which is driven by genetic program in DNA. From this point of view cognition and its evolution is “apart of biological evolution, which is characterized by constraints and innovations” (Huber, 2000) and can be best understood in the context of selection challenges, adaptational need and vitally important tasks that species had to address to survive and reproduce (Shettleworth, 2010). It can be inferred that driving forces of evolution of cognition are to be sought among vitally important tasks of survival and reproduction that major groups of species had to face.
5) How can we study cognition and behavior of extinct species?
“Cognitive performance does not fossilize, one cannot directly measure the cognitive traits of extinct species” (MacLean EL, Matthews LJ, Hare BA, et al, 2012) and studying evolution of cognition at high extent is speculative because can rely on our theoretical reconstructions, presumptions and imaginary models only. We have to admit that we are not able to provide irrefutable evidence that extinct species had the same behavior as their descendants, and that their cognition resembled the one of their contemporary relatives (Hodos and Campbell, 1969). Justification of inferences that ancestral turtles characterized by equal behavior and cognition as living ones – still remains an issue of probability and a trust to science. One of possible ways is to reconstruct their basic adaptational tasks of survival and reproduction based on the comparable ones in living descendant species.
6) What major transitions and milestones can be identified in evolution of cognition?
“It is trivially true that human cognition has evolved” (R.C. Lewontin, 1998), however we are still looking for a model representing basic stages, transitions and milestones in evolution of cognitions. Addressing this question requires clear answers on previous questions and identification of factors and driving forces, including selection pressure, adaptational challenges and tasks of survival and reproduction related to major groups of species on their evolutionary way from the most ancestral organisms to homo sapiens. Once these factors and driving forces are identified, it will be possible to trace what caused major transitions and made cognition of groups of species evolve.

7) Last in the list but probably the most fundamental question is – what do we mean by cognition when speaking about living organisms? And how do we determine what species possess cognition and what – don’t?
How do we define cognition when we speak about species other than humans and their closest relatives among primates and Stone Age ancestors? At what extent we are eligible to claim that cognition can be studied in general as universal trait of all species and living organisms on earth, including insects and “brainless” forms of life: plants, fungi, bacteria, etc.? The question of cognition in animals has been a battleground for ethologists and psychologists even few decades ago. Despite Charles Darwin’s (1871) claim that human and animal mind differs in extent rather than in its nature, it took many decades to accept the idea that cognition is not restricted to human beings (e.g. works of Shettleworth, Huber, Wilkinson, etc.). For example, Donald Griffin’s book “Animal Minds. Beyond Cognition to Consciousness” published in 1984 was labeled “the Satanic Verses of Animal Behavior” (Griffin, 1984; Davis, quoted by Thomas and Lorden, 1993).

The question of “cognition in animals” still remains controversial among specialists and there is no common view on what species have cognition and what do not. Similar question was raised in regard to “psyche” and its evolution by Alexei Leontiev in 1947, stating that there could be identified four equally viable approaches (Leontiev, 1947). Some approaches restrict cognition to only humans, some extend to Stone Age humans (see works of Tooby&Cosmides) or “higher” primates (see works of Premack, Woodruff, Heyes) and some go further and include those organisms who has a brain, some consider species with any kind of nervous system, some – follow a “pan-cognitive” paradigm and accept an idea that all living creatures on earth have cognition – whatever it is and at any extent (e.g., Lewontin, 1998; Ben Jacob et al, etc.2006). This approach requires to identify what are the key components, independent variables and parameters describing cognition, so we are able to study and compare cognitive capacities (including learning and problem solving capacities), for examples, of mammals, plants, and fungi.

These is only a selected list of the most fundamental questions that can be addressed on theoretical and heuristic level. The list is not complete yet, however these questions altogether outline a framework for the proposed approach and serve a guideline to development of a theoretical model of major transitions in evolution of cognition.

Cognition. Function. Pattern recognition.This work considers cognition according to Sara J. Shettleworth definition: “cognition, broadly defined, includes perception, learning, memory and decision making, in short all ways in which animals take in information about the world through the senses, process, retain and decide to act on it” (Shuttleworth, 2010). Its original function is to control behavior, enabling organism to adapt to changing environment, orient through complex environments, find food, escape predators and “make survival and reproduction of an organism more likely” (Huber&Wilkinson, 2012). In this sense cognition can be seen as a mediation between an organism and its surroundings which serves to recognize a task and produce the most adequate behavior to resolve this task successfully.
Cognition allows the organism to recognize the “meaning” of the current situation for its life at any given moment and to decide what to do, whether the situation requires any action, and, if so, what reaction or behavior needs to be produced.
Some information about such tasks and solutions is embedded in genes however, however, it does not seem that information about all possible situations is “preinstalled” in organisms: “while it is appealing to speak of “information” about the environment being “encoded” in the structural and physiological complexity of organisms, such statements remain in the realm of poetry” (Levins & Lewontin, 1985). What is even less likely - they have to learn each single situation every time it emerges.
How then do they recognize what kind of tasks require a reaction and what kind of elements (their representations) they process in order to produce adequate behavior?
Organisms in natural environment deal with relatively steady and limited scope of tasks. The most vitally important tasks are also the most recurrent and typical for each given species. In order to produce the most adequate behavior an organism needs to recognize, pick out and interpret a set of necessary and sufficient elements (or sign stimuli) that allow to elaborate an instruction what to do now and how to react – chase and attack, hide and escape, demonstrate and attract attention, deceive and camouflage, collaborate and communicate, compete and protect, etc.
Living organisms use pattern recognition identifying and addressing a vitally important task. Learning process in recurrent and identical vital situations, upon natural selection and gene mechanisms shape and anchor a series of elements (or “sign stimuli” – Lorenz, Tinbergen) into steady constellations or cognitive patterns – It allows organisms to save time and energy in recognizing the “meaning” of the situation to their life, make a decision, and produce the most adequate behavior at any given vital situation.
Many tests demonstrated that organisms are very selective in their response to external stimuli (Uexkull, Lorenz, Tinbergen, etc.) and “animals do react to only a few sign stimuli at any one time” (Tinbergen, 1951). Tinbergen repeated this idea several times rephrasing it in various ways across his work “The Study of Instinct”: “animal does not react to all the changes in the environment which its sense organs can receive, but only to a small part of them”. From the enormous flow of information in their surroundings organisms pick out and process a limited set of elements (or stimuli) that are essential for addressing a vitally important task at a given moment.
Tinbergen did not use the term cognitive pattern how, however, Tinbergen stressed out the main idea that organisms use pattern recognition when dealing with vitally important situations. According to a classic definition, pattern recognition means “matching information from a stimulus with information retrieved from memory” (Eysenck, M.W., Keane, M.T. 2003).

Now the next question comes up –is it possible to identify any basic cognitive patterns that are the most common, universal and shared between major groups of species or even all of living creature? The question can be put this way: although “in the animal kingdom there is not one brain, one sense, one problem and one solution” (Huber&Wilkinson, 2012), is it possible to identify any basic cognitive patterns that are the most common, universal, and shared between major groups of organisms, and then trace how their properties and the way of processing changed over the course of history of life on earth? Once these basic cognitive patterns are identified, it will be possible to trace what factors and tasks caused them to evolve and what sequence they comprise in phylogeny of life on earth.

List of major transitions
Proposed model considers cognition as an organism’s function addressing vitally important situation and tasks of survival and reproduction. This point of view represents the evolution of cognition as a series of transformations in the system “task – elements – cognitive pattern – capacities”.
The model represents evolution of cognition as phylogenetic tree of five consequential branches or tracks. Each major transition divides a current group of species into two and gives rise to a new track. At some moment in history of life, a group of species faces such a task, which is crucially vital for its survival and reproduction. Recurrent failure to addressing such task ultimately spells death for organisms and extinction for species. Resolving of such task requires species to recognize and process higher number and new kinds of elements to produce the most adequate behavior and address the task. In turn, each new task enables a given group of species with new cognitive and problem solving capacities. Each group constitutes a separate track (or a branch) and consequently form five successive, independent tracks (branches).
A tentative list of majors track, basic cognitive patterns, transitions and alterations is represented below. A separate paragraph dedicated for more comprehensive explanation will be provided further in the article.
1)Recognition on a binary “null or one” scale and production of respective behavior – move to or move from. The first basic cognitive pattern is called “binary”.
2)Recognition of separate objects and their characteristics, and production of respective behavior – move to the object and attack, or move from the object and defend. Second basic cognitive pattern is called “elementary”.
3)Recognition of objects, elements and parameters allowing to affect other organisms’ perception and direct their behavior in any certain way. The third basic cognitive pattern is called “manipulative”.
4) Recognition and retrieving information from dynamically changing group of interconnected objects for decision making and problem solving. The fourth basic cognitive pattern is called “combinatory”.
5) Recognition and processing symbols, signs, abstract ideas, etc. The fifth basic cognitive pattern is called “symbolic”.


The stages and milestones reflect transitions from one to five basic cognitive patterns, underlying problem solving capacities of major groups of organisms (or even all of them) in addressing basic tasks of survival and reproduction.
Each transition is attributed to emergence of a new basic adaptational task and development of a basic respective cognitive pattern processing a new set of elements and enhance in cognitive, problem solving and behavioral capacities in a group of species. Such basic tasks and cognitive patterns are to be sought among the most common, sustainable and shared by all organisms of major groups of species or even by all living creatures in general. They are not just simplest ones; on the contrary, this kind of elements (sign stimuli) are the most universal and vital, they are essential and necessary for survival and reproduction of all organisms of a given group.

Task-based approach to evolution of cognitionWhat kind of needs can be denoted as most essential or basic ones? How can we differentiate them and what are the criteria for distinguishing basic and any other organisms’ tasks?

Is a spider’s need in recognition of a net vibrations essential or not? It seems obvious that this task is essential for spiders whose foraging strategy relies on catching prey with a net. However it is not essential for any other species, even for spiders who hunt using means other than a net. To identify the most basic and essential needs we have to step on a higher level of generalization and seek for the most universal task. From this point of view one of such tasks could be a need to recognize separate objects and their key parameters and identify if it is a prey or a predator. On the other hand, there are species that do not need to recognize separate objects, for example, autotrophs whose survival strategy is based on recognition of favorable environment and requires distinguishing on binary “null” or “one” scale.

Thus, basic tasks and corresponding basic cognitive patterns are not species-specific. Instead, they cut across a large number of species (or even all living organisms and species), regardless of their habitat, morphology, lifestyle, reproductive strategies, phylogenetic relationships, etc.

From this point of view basic needs and tasks constitute a ground for surviving and reproduction and underly all other kinds of adaptational activities and problem solving behavior. Other tasks can be accomplished and their solutions make sense only if basic tasks has been addressed properly first. Although completion of basic task does not guarantee survival or reproduction, repetitive failure to address the task results in death of an individual organism and ultimately leads to extinction of a species. For example, failure to recognize a hunter timely at a given situation ultimately negates the rest of living activities and behavior. In this sense basic cognitive patterns may be seen as a central structure that organizes and controls all other adaptational activities of organisms and species aimed at surviving and reproduction.

The proposed model of transition in basic tasks and basic cognitive patterns refers to approaches to studying evolution of behavior – phylogenetic (or historical) and adaptational (functional), represented by Hodos and Campbell in their classic work “Scala naturae: Why there is no theory in comparative psychology (Hodos&Campbell, 1969)”. Although authors’ approach was proposed for studying behavior, it can also be applied to cognition at full extent, because “a function of cognition is to control behavior” (Huber&Wilkinson, 2012) and these two are inexorably intertwined in addressing adaptational tasks.
This approach is seeking for identification of the most ancestral, historically distant and universal (“primitive” – Hodos&Campbell, 1969) cognitive patterns aimed at addressing respective basic tasks underlying survival and reproduction. Once such task and pattern are identified, the major transitions in basic cognitive patterns will be traced to see what factors, challenges, selection pressure caused organism to develop new basic cognitive patterns and what kind of tasks they had to face in order to survive and get a chance to reproduce.
According to this model major transformations emerge when a group of species cannot proceed with the current set of basic cognitive patterns. Under selection pressure caused by a new basic task a group of species is forced to elaborate and adopt a new basic cognitive pattern. This group separates from the mainstream and forms its own track (a branch) consisted by species sharing a set of two basic tasks and cognitive pattern underlying their survival and reproduction. All subsequent tracks are formed in the same way - a new one separates from previous one by a new basic task.

See the Picture 1 of 1.

Thus, a whole path of evolution of cognition can be described as phylogenetic tree of five consequential branches or tracks separated by a number of basic adaptational tasks and basic cognitive patterns enabled. Each major transition divides a current group of species into two and gives rise to a new track and a new basic cognitive pattern.
From this model perspective major groups of species constituting separate branches can be inferred that basic cognitive patterns do not merge, because basic tasks emerged on previous tracks remain viable and has to be addressed at the same extent on a new track. Organisms of each new track are required to address higher number (plus one) of basic adaptational tasks. Therefore, each single track (branch) enables organisms with a corresponding number of basic cognitive patterns allowing them to produce extended scope of cognitive and behavioral solutions for survival and reproduction.
All species of a given track are capable to resolve a given set of basic tasks and become equipped with respective basic cognitive patterns and problem solving capacities. The extent at which such capacities are developed in a specific species depends on multiple factors, e.g. lifestyle, habitat, morphology, anatomical and biological peculiarities, etc. For instance, cognitive capacities of some mammals species (including humans) have been boosted by development of neocortex. At the same time cognitive capacities of collaborating birds, like crows or parrots, also demonstrate impressive capabilities, in some field exceeding mammals (for example, see works Bitterman, Shettleworth, Huber, Wilkinson, etc.), however rudimentary neocortex might impose certain limitations in further development of cognitive and intellectual capacities in species like birds, fish, insects.

Five basic cognitive-behavioural patterns and tracks

First cognitive-behavioural pattern and the track
By applying the proposed task-based approach to identification of basic cognitive patterns, the first track (a branch) can be identified. All species constituting this track are characterized by one common need in addressing a basic task of recognizing an appropriate for living environment. This task is universal and shared by autotrophs, protists and all species that do not employ purposeful hunting and escaping strategies that require identification of separate objects. Assuming that the fundamental needs of living autotrophs remain basically the same as the ones of their ancestral relatives, it can be inferred that their survival strategies were also based on addressing a need to distinguish between “favorable” and “undesirable” environments, regardless species-specific preferences.
The first basic cognitive pattern can be called “binary”, because it enables organism’s cognitive capacity to recognize environment and navigate between two categories on a binary scale “null and one”. This capacities can be seen in modern bacteria and one-celled organisms (Jennings, 1906), which include “interpretation of chemical messages, distinction between internal and external information, and a sort of self vs. non-self-distinction (peers and cheaters)” (Ben Jacob et al, 2006).
These two categories represent a set of key and obligatory elements that all organisms are required to recognize to stay alive and reproduce. From the origin of life (or ability of the first organisms to move – depends on the hypothesis of where the life on Earth originated – in water or on the surface) to the emergence of active heterotrophs employing purposeful hunting, this basic cognitive pattern underlies the ability of organisms to survive and reproduce.

Second cognitive-behavioural pattern and the track
The second track emerges due to transition from one basic cognitive pattern to the second, when a large group of organisms started hunting and evading hunter on purpose. This triggered development of a new cognitive pattern enabled organisms’ capacity in recognition and localization of separate objects as well as their key parameters in order to decide what to do and which way to go – to chase and catch, or to defend and escape. The second basic cognitive pattern can be called “elementary”, as species of this track embrace ability to recognize and perceive separate elements – objects, key parameters and characteristics.
A group of species who adopted two basic cognitive patterns constitutes a separate track (a branch) consisting of heterotrophs and phanerozoic organisms, employing purposeful hunting and evasion. As it has been noted earlier, emergence of a new track and basic cognitive pattern does not reduce importance of the previous ones because a need, they are aimed at, remains vitally important for species of a new track too. However, species of the second track cannot survive on the first basic cognitive patterns and have to develop a new one to eschew extinction. Thus, all species of this track share two basic cognitive patterns, underlying their surviving and reproductive strategies.

Emergence of this basic pattern was accompanied by a burst of biological development on the border of Ediacaran and Cambrian periods when purposeful hunting and active defense became a vital task for large group of species. Some species were able to consume other organism without recognition of single objects as, for example, contemporary jellyfish or polyp, however it did not make them active and purposeful hunters. They relied on accidental contact with potential prey and its passive consumption; they employed only one – the first one – basic cognitive pattern which is capable to fully address this task.
Active and purposeful hunting and evasion required recognition of separate objects and their key parameters which resulted in a diversity and increase in organs and structures as well as behavioral patterns that served new functions addressing new tasks of purposeful hunting and evasion: defense, protection, pursuit, escape, capture, identification, recognition, etc.

Third cognitive-behavioural pattern and the track
The third track and basic cognitive pattern emerges due to an increasing need in purposeful hunting and development of sexual reproduction. It composed a new basic task – avoidance of recognition by other organisms and at the same tame attraction of potential partner’s attention that can be achieved by eliciting desirable reaction or response in others by producing certain kinds of signals or changing own behavior.
This task emerges as the “flip side” of the previous one: once the ability to recognize and localize separate objects (and their key parameters) was developed, it became possible and vitally important to manipulate perception of others in order to reduce own appearance and manifest presence to a potential partner or a competitor.
The third cognitive pattern enables organisms to recognize and produce signals that affect other organisms’ perception and direct their behavior in a certain way. It triggered a development of cognitive and behavioral capacities in active camouflage and demonstration: pretend, deceive, mislead, hide, attract or distract, manifest, show off, etc. For such capacities this basic cognitive pattern can be called “manipulative”.
As it can be seen not only animals possess such capabilities. Survival and reproductive strategies of many species of plants, fungi, insects depend on this pattern immensely and employ it to attract attention, deceive, direct, navigate, etc. Some species of this track managed to develop special organs or accessories, mostly on the body surface. Some employed special behavioral patterns and ability to use elements of the environment to manipulate the attention of other organisms. And some of them used a combination of these two strategies.
Organisms’ capacity to produce signals affecting other’s perception and behavior, and vice-versa to receive and recognize such signals from others, constituted a ground for organisms’ ability of multicellular organisms to collaborate and interact in achievement of mutual goals.

Fourthcognitive-behavioural pattern and the track
The fourth basic task emerged from the need to interact and collectively protect clutches and rear offspring. There have been identified at least two basic reproductive strategies – r and K (MacArthur and Wilson). The first one is based on higher number of offspring and less protection, while the second is based on less offspring and more parental protection and investment in rearing.
Some species that adopted the second strategy had to develop the ability to interact in pairs or small groups. This required processing of new sets of information related to the interaction of a group of two or more interrelated objects: making sense of others’ behavior, relating one’s own behavior to others, communicating, evaluating, interpreting and sending signals to others, predicting, understanding the context of a situation in relation to the group dynamics, etc.
A new basic cognitive pattern enables species’ capacities in processing simultaneous changes in a series of multiple associated objects. This basic cognitive pattern can be called “combinatory” because it provides multicellular organisms with the ability to retrieve information from a combination of objects and understand group dynamics. It enabled a new capacity to interact and collaborate in those species who adopted rearing offspring in pares or small groups. As it can be seen in contemporary species (e.g. mammals, collaborating birds, fish, insects), this stimulated intellectual capacities in such species.
Subsequently, greater number of group members and a higher degree of their interaction contributed to improving cognitive abilities in species such as mammals, cohabiting and collaborating birds, fish and insects, especially those species that employed hunting, forceful attacks and defense, forays, assaults (for example, see Dunbar RI, Shultz S., 2007; Fitch WT, Huber L, Bugnyar T., 2010; Lefebvre L, Reader SM, Sol D., 2004; Reader SM, Laland KN., 2002; Emery NJ, Clayton NS, 2005, etc.). Especially substantial progress in brain development have been reached by mammals who had already managed to develop the rudiment of a “pra-neocortex”, initially using it predominantly for “sniffing” and identification of a sexual partner (Saveliev, 2010, 2015). Additional advancements gained those mammals whose lifestyle evolved in three-dimensional habitats – primates, dolphins, orcas, etc.

Fifth cognitive-behavioural pattern and the track
The fifth basic cognitive pattern can be called “symbolic” because it enables to process symbols, imagination, associations, abstract objects, ideas, etc., which are not directly related to the given context or current situation. It develops as a consequence of previous capacity to recognize a group of interconnected objects and retrieve information from its dynamics. Previous capacity related mostly to tangible objects in an on-going situation. In contrast, new basic cognitive pattern allows to process imaginary representations of objects and their meanings, associations and dynamics, or, so to say, “the ability to operate objects in their absence” (Luria, 1979).
This capacity rapidly gained high importance and adaptational value both for an individual and a group as a whole. As individual well-being becomes increasingly dependent on the group, new basic task needs to be addressed – strengthening of a group adaptational and survival capacities through complex interaction of its members. The fifth basic cognitive pattern evolves upon two factors – contribution to a strength of the whole group and, at the same time, improvement of individual’s position in the hierarchy within the group. The group members who make better use of the fifth basic cognitive pattern contribute to strengthening the whole group and are more likely to gain a higher position in the group hierarchy, and benefit from it in terms of individual well-being and reproduction. Increased role of interaction, along with brain exaptation processes, contributed to the development of communication using symbols, language (according to Pavlov, “the second signaling system”), abstract thinking, imagination, association, etc.
Humans constitute a major part of the fifth track and inherited all five basic cognitive patterns. This allows to place humans on top of cognitive evolution, however it does not explain what made human cognition so uniquely complex and specialized in thinking (Heyes, 2012). Some other “higher” mammals as chimpanzees, gorillas, dolphins, orcas, etc. share fifth track with humans and demonstrate impressive cognitive capacities that are not inferior to humans’ in general. However, the question why only human cognition was able to produce tools, formal language, science, remarkably complex culture and society is yet to be answered.

Conclusion
The proposed model is an attempt to conceptualize the evolution of cognition within a framework “basic tasks – basic cognitive patterns” and trace major transitions from a historical and functional perspective on species needs in resolving basic tasks of survival and reproduction. This model provides a framework for discussion on how evolution has shaped cognition out of the organisms’ need and capacities in recognition of vitally important tasks.

The work identifies five major transitions and development of five successive basic cognitive patterns: binary, elementary, manipulative, combinatory, and symbolic. Each transition is caused by a new basic task of survival and reproduction, and causes major group of species to develop a basic cognitive pattern to recognize and resolve this task. Each track consisted of species who developed their adaptation and problem-solving strategies on equal number of basic cognitive patterns. Addressing every new basic task enables new cognitive and problem solving capacities and behavioral patterns in a given group of species.

The proposed model can be used for prediction of cognitive and behavioral capacities of species. As the model considers cognition as an intrinsic function of any organisms to control behavior for addressing vitally important tasks (survival and reproduction), it can be applied to all living creatures (including extinct ones), regardless of their place on a phylogenetic tree or Scala naturae, domain (kingdom, species, etc.), brain or nervous system, morphology, lifestyle, habitat, etc. It can be a contribution to classification and development of a cognitive taxonomy of species and rank them by a number of basic cognitive patterns and corresponding capacities enabled.

Few fundamental questions still require further investigation. As this model is based on theoretical and heuristic approaches, it needs to find biological and genetic correlates to prove them. Another question for further investigation refers to the number of major transitions identified and higher number of basic cognitive patterns emerged. More than five transitions could be identified, and some other tasks and patterns are expected to be found. The last question refers to exact list of species constituting each track and species constituting transitional or intermediate forms between major tracks.

Although this model does not claim to be an exhaustive or exclusive explanation of evolution of cognition (if it is possible at all), however it may provide clues to understanding how organisms perceive the world, what underlies their “umwelt” and “merkwelt” (Uexkull, 2010), what types of elements (sign stimuli) species are required and capable to process, what kind of problems they are able to resolve and what solutions they are able to elaborate. Ultimately, this approach can contribute to answering Tinbergen’s four questions to studying animals behavior.

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Author: Frolov Sergei (c)